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In the Mood for Thought: 
Feeling and Thinking in Philosophy
René Rosfort and Giovanni Stanghellini
The practice of philosophy is not commonly associated with the expression of emotion. That is to say, while philosophers sometimes take emotion as their subject, they rarely attend to the 
affective aspects of their own discourse. And yet, while these aspects may 
seem secondary to analytical content, they are central to how questions 
are posed and to the reflective scope of a text. This affective character 
or temperament of thinking could be called the philosophical mood. 
Some philosophers are melancholy skeptics, others are good-humored 
pragmatists; some naturalists, others religious; some are attracted to the 
transcendent, others remain focused on the empirical world; some are 
inherently suspicious about established political and scientific norms, 
others are more confident that we are on the right track. These ingrained 
and often obscurely formed attitudes and beliefs are not only manifest 
in the issues selected and arguments pursued, but also in the tone, style, 
and sensibility of inquiry. Although few today would argue for a strict 
separation of thought and feeling, there is still a tendency to consider 
the mood of a philosophical text as secondary to the argument itself. 
In what follows, we shall question this frequent separation of thought 
from feeling via an examination of the concept of mood. In doing so, 
we hope to shed some light on the affective dimensions of philosophy. 
We start with an extensive consideration of the dual focus on bodily 
feelings and cognitive emotions that has characterized the philosophy 
of emotions since the end of the nineteenth century. We argue that, 
although the philosophy of emotions has gained from the analytical 
clarity of this focus, such clarity has come at a cost. First, our philosophi-
cal vocabulary for describing emotional experience has been narrowed 
down to two conceptual categories, feelings and emotions, which means 
that other affective terms, such as passions, sensations, affects, and ap-
petites, only rarely feature in philosophical analyses. Second, there is 
a resulting bifurcation in our conception of emotional experience as 
either the expression of mere physiology or the result of sophisticated 
rational dispositions. This discussion offers the conceptual background 
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for what follows and explains why our exploration takes us back, first to 
Descartes in the first half of the seventeenth century, and, in the final 
section, to Kant at the end of the following century. 
In the second section, we look at Descartes’s conception of wonder 
in the light of his metaphysical commitment to disembodied reason. 
We hope to show how Descartes’s treatment of the passions makes his 
distinction between body and soul more complex than commonly as-
sumed. We argue that his analysis of wonder brings out the inescapable 
ambivalence of physiology and cognition at the heart of emotional life. 
The phenomenon of wonder shows that these two basic aspects cannot 
be separated without distorting our understanding of human emotions. 
In the third section, we use the treatment of Descartes to support our 
examination of the phenomenon of mood. Contrary to the analytical 
categories of feeling and emotion, mood does not lend itself to either 
a physiological or a rational explanation. We describe the phenomenal 
character of mood and argue that it does not help us in our quest for 
the “what” or the “why” of our feelings. Rather, mood is an ambivalent 
phenomenon that brings out “how” we feel what we feel, and it helps 
us to appreciate the subjectivity of feeling, that is, the attitude involved 
in our feeling and thinking about what we feel. 
We conclude with a suggestive consideration of the phenomenon of 
mood as a rarely acknowledged, although highly significant, feature of 
philosophical writing. Taking a look at Kant’s understanding of wonder 
and transcendence, we argue that the mood of a philosopher has a sig-
nificant bearing on how she or he examines and answers philosophical 
questions. Mood, in short, has consequences for intellectual method.   
The Quest for Answers
Since the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the philosophy 
of emotion has undergone a bifurcation. On the one hand, we find ad-
vocates for the primacy of bodily feelings who argue that physiological 
reverberations are what makes an emotion emotional. On the other, there 
are those who consider cognitive capacities and rational dispositions to 
be at the heart of emotional life. The first group, commonly called feel-
ing theories, includes thinkers such as William James, Antonio Damasio, 
Jenefer Robinson, and Jesse Prinz.1 The second group, known as cognitive 
theories, includes figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Anthony Kenny, Robert 
Gordon, Martha Nussbaum, and not least Robert Solomon.2 The view 
held by the latter has enjoyed an almost undisputed hegemony during 
most of the twentieth century.
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According to this overall picture of our emotional life, affect can be ap-
proached by means of two conceptual categories: (intentional) emotions 
and (bodily) feelings. Emotions refer to the structured and propositional 
affective states that include a more or less explicit intentional attitude, 
as in complex emotions such as love, pride, shame, and jealousy. Feel-
ings, on the other hand, cover the prereflective, bodily felt aspect of an 
affective state, where we perceive something going on in the landscape 
of our body, often without our being in control of or exercising an influ-
ence over these feelings. Central to this category of affective states are 
clearly embodied feelings that are physically manifested, such as fear, 
anger, surprise, joy, and aggression. Whereas the category of emotions 
is primarily concerned with human affectivity, bodily feelings are held 
to show similar behavioral patterns across various species. 
To appreciate the crucial difference between cognitive and feeling 
theories in their methodological approach to emotional life, we have 
to understand that they are part of a more general discussion of hu-
man nature that has shaped the intellectual climate of the twentieth 
century. There are two central aspects to this discussion that need to be 
mentioned. First, there is the advance of science and the consequent 
decline of religion, and second, as a consequence, a conflict internal to 
philosophy between causal and rational explanations of human behavior. 
Since the publication of Darwin’s revolutionary Origin of Species in 1859, 
and especially the subsequent publications of his more “existentially” ori-
ented works, The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expressions of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals (1872), science has become of inarguable relevance 
to philosophical investigations of human nature. At the time of the first 
scientific revolution in the sixteenth century, the causal, mathematical, 
and mechanical explanation of human nature was held in check by a 
predominant philosophical view informed by a religious (Christian) 
conception of human existence. In opposition to the religious emphasis 
on divine providence and unfathomable divine justice, the emerging 
scientific approach steadily strengthened its claim that the best way to 
understand and improve human behavior lay in the recognition that 
God, whether or not he exists and cares for the individual human being, 
does not intervene into worldly affairs and is therefore best kept out 
of investigations of human nature and society.3 After Darwin’s decisive 
blow to entrenched religious narratives, the philosophical arguments 
for retaining religious considerations in the approach to human nature 
quickly collapsed, and the naturalistic attitude which has since character-
ized philosophy—in particular the Anglophone tradition—won almost 
universal support.4 This development would have a significant bearing 
on the bifurcation in the philosophy of emotion. 
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The naturalistic atmosphere entailed by the Darwinian revolution also 
made life difficult for philosophy as a discipline. The rational core of 
philosophical investigations and the philosophical faith in the powers of 
logical analysis were suddenly challenged by the rationally blind forces 
of causality at work in evolution. An evolutionary perspective accorded 
explanatory significance to the animal aspect of human behavior at 
the cost of diminishing rationality. Nowhere do the limits of rationality 
become more visible than in the emotional aspects of human behavior. 
In fact, in their effort to establish psychology as a scientific discipline 
at the turn of the century, both William James and Freud argued for 
the importance of a biological, that is, arational, understanding of emo-
tional experience. In what is generally considered the founding text of 
feeling theories, James makes this insistence on the visceral character 
of emotional experience almost palpable: 
What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened 
heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened 
limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite 
impossible to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of 
it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clench-
ing of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, 
calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot.5
James directed attention to the obvious embodied character of emo-
tional experience and argued that what is important in human emotions 
is not their rational structures, but the cross-species visceral feelings 
that bypass, or at least radically transform, our rational dispositions. To 
understand what emotions are, we must therefore focus on their causal 
underpinning and not on the intentional or rational structures that also 
seem to characterize human emotions. This view was not received well 
among philosophers, for the obvious reason that it seems to push the 
subject of emotions out of philosophy and into the more empirically 
oriented sciences such as experimental psychology or psychoanalysis, 
and more recently the cognitive sciences, evolutionary psychology, and 
neuroscience. As a consequence, partly to defend the validity of philo-
sophical investigations of emotions, partly due to genuine problems with 
the physiological account, philosophers rejected feeling theories early 
in the twentieth century. Subsequently, the philosophy of emotions was 
almost entirely dominated by cognitive theories until the beginning of 
the 1990s, where the staggering cultural impact of neuroscience rein-
troduced feeling theories into philosophy. 
The long tradition of cognitive theories of emotion redirects atten-
tion from the bodily character of feelings to the intentional or rational 
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structures of emotional experience. Human emotions are significantly 
different from emotions observed in other animals because human emo-
tions are always characterized, if not explicitly by rational, then at least 
by basic intentional structures. Human emotions are conscious in a way 
that the emotions of other animals are not. This is not to say that the 
cognitive approach rejects the naturalistic stance of evolutionary theory. 
It merely argues that the explanatory burden of a philosophy of emotion 
has to be on the cognitive aspect of emotional experience. What really 
matters is not so much how we feel an emotion, but how our emotions 
make us think about, or reflectively evaluate, the world, other people, 
and ourselves. The late Robert C. Solomon, one of the undisputed 
champions of the cognitive approach, brings out this insistence with a 
forceful eloquence comparable to that of James above: “The feelings no 
more constitute or define the emotion than an army of fleas constitute 
a homeless dog. They are always there, take shape of the emotion, but 
just as easily move from one emotion to the other (love to hate, fear to 
anger, jealousy to resentment). Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, 
not its essence.”6 The focus on the reflective aspect of our emotional 
experience conveys a strongly normative, even explicitly ethical, twist 
to the cognitive account. While feeling theories tend to emphasize the 
passive, involuntary aspect of emotions (the sensation of the emotion), 
cognitive theories are principally concerned with how to make sense of 
our emotions in order to allow the person to act appropriately when in 
an emotional state. Once again, Solomon is not shy about this norma-
tive aspect of his own theory: 
I once summed up Sartre’s philosophy and existentialism in general with the 
simple statement, No Excuses! And that is how I would like you to think about the 
emotions, too. Not that they don’t have their causes. Not that they aren’t often 
dictated or circumscribed by circumstances. Not that there are not sometimes 
passions over which we really do have little control. But instead of shrugging off 
responsibility, thinking “I am not responsible for my emotions,” I want to urge 
you to ask, whenever you can, “why am I doing this? What am I getting out of 
this?” And you may well find that by taking responsibility you will no longer feel 
like the victim of your own emotions.7
This insistence on the rational structure of emotional experience, to-
gether with its normative aim draws a picture of our emotional life which 
is significantly different from that of feeling theories. 
The difference between the two theories is ultimately anchored in op-
posing conceptions of human nature. Feeling theories, fascinated by the 
discoveries of science, are convinced that our emotions are principally 
the expression of the inescapable, arational, and anonymous (neuro)
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biological nature that we share with other animals. If we want to under-
stand what humans really are, we have to dismantle our unwarranted 
belief in our own cognitive superiority and focus our investigation on 
what the raw material of our emotional life can tell us about ourselves, 
namely, that we are not all that different from our less articulate mam-
malian cousins. Cognitive theories, on the other hand, insist that our 
rational capacities make our emotional life radically different from that 
of other animals. Our emotions may challenge our rational dispositions, 
but to be human is to be rational, so we must single out and cultivate the 
intentional and rational structures in the uncouth texture of emotional 
life. Our inarticulate bodily feelings are therefore to be considered as 
secondary in our endeavor to make sense of and, ultimately, control 
our emotions. 
Naturally, the present situation in the philosophy of emotions is more 
complex than the brief outline that we have presented here.8 Neverthe-
less, it is hard to dispute that the categories of emotion and feeling, 
and the corresponding conceptions of human nature implicit in feeling 
theories, are still dominating the debate.
Thomas Dixon has recently investigated the historical development 
shaping this bifurcation by tracing how the category of emotion was 
formed out of the realm of such variegated notions as passions, appetites, 
affections, and sensations in Anglophone psychological thought. He 
claims that the scientific, antitheological “spring cleaning” of an earlier 
psychological vocabulary, resulting in the creation of a secular category 
of emotion during the nineteenth century, is an important factor in sus-
taining the untenable distinction between reason and emotions: “In the 
absence of categories such as ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments’ that bridged 
the gap between thinking and feeling, secular psychologies of emotion 
were left with a simple and sharp dichotomy between cognition and 
emotion.”9 According to Dixon, this is not simply a transformation of 
an outdated psychological vocabulary into a new and more scientifically 
accurate one. Rather, the narrowing down of the psychological vocabu-
lary about our affective states to the exclusive categories of emotion and 
feeling is the expression of the shift in worldview that we have sketched 
above. The antitheological attitude that dominated the scientific en-
deavors in the second half of the nineteenth century dispensed, in the 
name of scientific progress, with the rich material of the long tradition 
of theories of emotions. In other words, a long and complex history of 
thinking about affective states was lost from view. 
Since antiquity, theories of emotions had been concerned with rich 
and complex affective textures including passions (e.g. good, evil, ap-
propriate, disruptive), stratified appetites (e.g. vegetative, sensitive, 
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rational), an array of bodily sensations (e.g. pain, pleasure, discomfort, 
satisfaction), affections (e.g. intellectual, vital, spiritual, animal), moral 
sentiments (e.g. compassion, sympathy, duty), temperaments, and moods 
(e.g. melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine, sad, euphoric).10 Contrary to 
the conceptions consolidated in the twentieth century that view emo-
tional life as governed by either rational structures or the fluctuations 
of bodily feelings, emotions as we find them in these earlier theories 
are far more ambivalent—and obviously much more difficult to handle 
conceptually. Notions such as passions, sensations, affections, tempera-
ment, and moods are complex semantic mixtures that include reason 
as well as sensibility, the voluntary as well as the involuntary, activity as 
well as passivity. That is to say, they are principally used to describe the 
experiential fact that our thinking is always affectively qualified. The gist 
of Dixon’s argument is that the disappearance of the traditional Christian 
conception of the soul as the affective battlefield between intellect and 
will lead to the creation of the present dichotomy of rational thinking 
without feeling versus thoughtless bodily feeling. Dixon therefore asks 
us to take the history of emotions seriously so that standards built on 
antitheological and other prejudices will not end up hampering our 
understanding of human affectivity. An appreciation of the historical 
aspect of emotions ensures a critical awareness of the implicit ontologi-
cal and epistemological presuppositions of the vocabulary with which 
we understand and explain our emotions today. 
We agree with the broad strokes of Dixon’s historical argument. The 
scientific discrediting of a religious conception of human nature was 
indeed a major factor in the replacement of a fine-grained emotional 
vocabulary with the narrow, and consequently conflicting, categories 
of bodily feeling and cognitive emotions. We do think, however, that 
Dixon’s tacit partiality towards a cognitive picture of human affectivity 
tends to downplay the significance of the physiological aspect of emo-
tional life—a theme that was brewing in the philosophical texts of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that was finally made explicit 
through the Darwinian revolution. The first scientific revolution, in the 
sixteenth century, made philosophers aware of the importance of the 
arational physiology of our emotions, while still being able to retain 
(god-given) rationality as the principal feature of human nature. This 
tension of arational bodily feelings and rational thinking resulted in an 
ambivalence in the philosophical texts in the period from the sixteenth 
to the nineteenth century that was eventually dissolved with the post-
Darwinian emphasis on bodily feelings and the subsequent dismissal of 
such feelings in the predominant cognitive accounts of twentieth-century 
philosophy. 
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There is no doubt that the investigative focus of both feeling theories 
and cognitive theories have contributed enormously to our understand-
ing of human emotions. We have come to a better understanding of the 
causal underpinning and rational aspects of emotional experience and 
behavior. Yet the clarity of such answers is provided at a cost. By aiming 
at either biological or rational explanations, we overlook the affective 
character already at work in our scientific or philosophical attitude. Or 
to put it differently, making emotions the object of our investigation, 
we risk missing out on the affective texture involved in our own ques-
tioning, that is, the peculiar mood of our explanatory endeavor. The 
disappearance of the rich emotional vocabulary of the pre-Darwinian 
tradition is, as Dixon argues, responsible for the gap between thinking 
and feeling in contemporary emotional theories. Without thorough at-
tention to more ambivalent phenomena such as sensations, affections, 
passions, and moods, we end up with an account of emotional life that 
is insensitive to the ineradicable affective entwinement of both arational 
and rational factors at work in philosophical reflection. 
One way to test the strength of Dixon’s argument is to look at how 
feeling and thinking are related in perhaps the most famous among 
the founding fathers of modern philosophy. René Descartes is known 
to embody several features of the present day ideal of what it takes to 
be a good scientist: he was a staunch rationalist, a gifted mathematician, 
and not least a zealous advocate for disinterested research. And yet, in 
spite of Descartes’s sharp distinction between mind and body, we will 
argue that his theory of the passions shows that the union of body and 
soul is far more complex than is often assumed. In short, the Cartesian 
tradition—paradoxically—offers fruitful resources for rethinking the 
modern language of emotion and exploring the connections between 
thought and feeling.
Descartes’s Ambivalence:  
Incurious Wonder and Intellectual Joy
Disembodied and abstract thinking are what we normally associate 
with Descartes’s reconfiguration of philosophy. According to a familiar 
narrative, the modern period of Western thought was born with the 
strict separation of mind and body. Rationality was finally stripped of the 
encroaching perturbations of a sinful bodily matter that was portrayed 
in a gloomy light in medieval Western thought, and it thus provided the 
methodological groundwork for the scientific revolutions that went on 
to shape the world we know today. The passionless cogito, that is, the 
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“I think,” stripped of worldly colors, smells, shapes, and sensations, is 
the only objectively secure foundation upon which I can come to know 
that I exist, or as the famous dictum from the Discourse on Method puts 
it, I think, therefore I am. 
There is, however, another, more fleshy and passionate side to the 
Cartesian cogito that has been, and still is, too often forgotten in the 
eager denouncements of Descartes’s ontological separation of mind and 
body. There is no doubt that Descartes operates with a strict distinction 
between disembodied mind and deanimated body. However, the rela-
tion of mind and body is not a static hegemony of the mind over the 
body, as many readers of Descartes presume, but a dynamic unity.11 The 
ontological fissure between mind and body is due to the irreducible 
strength of these two fundamental parts of the human self which can-
not be reduced to one another.12 The human self is complex because of 
this fragmentation, and in order to understand myself as a human self 
I must understand “my body, or rather my whole self [meum corpus sive 
potius me totum],”13 as he writes in the sixth and final meditation of his 
most famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Some lines earlier in 
the same paragraph, he explains the inextricable character of this unity:
There is nothing that this nature teaches me more explicitly than that I have 
a body that is ill-disposed when I feel pain, that needs food and drink when I 
suffer hunger or thirst, and the like. Therefore, I should not doubt that there 
is some truth in this. 
By means of these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, nature also 
teaches me that I am present in my body not merely in the way a sailor is present 
in a ship, but that I am most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with 
it, so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing.14 
Recent years have seen growing interest in this integral and dynamic 
unity of mind and body, largely based on one of Descartes’s lesser known 
works from the final years of his brief life, The Passions of the Soul.15 We 
are indebted to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia for this intriguing book. 
During their extensive correspondence in the years 1643–49, Elisabeth, 
who was an ingenious philosopher in her own right, questioned Descartes 
about several aspects of his philosophy.16 Most famously, she asked how 
the soul and body could affect one another, given Descartes’s dualist 
commitments.17 Descartes at first provided vague and unsatisfying replies 
to Elisabeth’s inquiries, but her sharp arguments and perseverance 
inspired him to turn his attention to the complex unity of soul and 
body. And in November 1645 Descartes decided to write a treatise on 
the passions of the soul, intended originally for her eyes only.18 Several 
requests from his private friends finally convinced Descartes to publish 
the work in 1649. 
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The great variety of human passions is what makes us understand that 
our thinking about the world and ourselves is always embodied. Des-
cartes’s account of emotional life is thoroughly physiological, which is why 
he characterizes almost all human emotions, feelings, and sensations as 
“animal spirits” and understands them as aspects of our passivity, hence 
the name “passions.” The passions of the soul are something that we 
endure through “the machine of our bodies” (PS art. 7:21), that is, the 
involuntary bodily movement connected with our thinking and acting as 
embodied selves through the mysterious little pineal gland,19 and as such 
they reveal the receptive or passive side of the cogito. The passions are 
thus embodied thoughts and defined as “perceptions or sensations or 
excitations of the soul which are referred to it in particular and which 
are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the 
spirits” (PS art. 27:34). To differentiate the variety of human passions, 
Descartes orders them according to their formal objects, that is, accord-
ing to the various ways things in the world harm, profit, or are generally 
important to the embodied self, and he individuates six primitive pas-
sions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness, of which the great 
variety of human passions are either species or combinations (PS art. 
69:56). Of the six primitive passions, wonder (l’admiration) is the most 
basic, and the most interesting for the purpose of this essay, in that it 
exemplifies the persistent ambivalence of rational and bodily feelings 
at the center of our emotional life. 
At the time of Descartes, wonder was a time-hallowed and highly 
ambivalent passion. Aristotle famously credited wonder (thauma) with 
the birth of philosophy, but a more ambivalent attitude towards wonder 
can be traced through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, where the 
exploratory powers of wonder were tarnished by the Christian suspicion 
of vain and profane curiosity.20 Descartes inherited this ambivalence, 
although more for scientific reasons than religious ones. Like many 
natural philosophers of his time, he was rather uneasy with the wonder-
struck curiosity provoked by the staggering scientific, geographic, and 
cultural discoveries of his time. 21 To be flabbergasted at the mysterious 
wonders of the world is a symptom of ignorance, Descartes thought, and 
as such it “prolongs the sickness of the blindly curious—that is, those 
who investigate rarities only to wonder at them and not to understand 
them” (PS art. 78:61). The merely curious enjoy the passion of wonder 
for the sake of the pleasure entailed by surprise and astonishment; this 
pleasure perverts, and sometimes even eradicates, the use of reason if 
we revel in passive enjoyment too long (PS art. 76:59–60). Despite the 
risks of stupefying curiosity, however, wonder remains the most impor-
tant passion in our emotional life. Wonder is not only the first among 
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the passions, but also the most peculiar one. It is the sole passion that 
does not involve motion of the blood or the heart, but that stirs only 
the activity of the brain, which is the seat of scientific knowledge (PS 
art. 71:57). As such it can be properly characterized as an intellectual 
passion, since the sensible motions that it causes takes place in the brain 
and not among the fluctuations of the somatic landscape of the body. 
Here, though, as Jean-Marie Beyssade has pointed out, it is important 
not to forget the physiological conditions for Descartes’s examination 
of the passions. Even though wonder does not involve the motion of 
grosser animal spirits, it still has a purely physiological cause, and as 
such it should be considered as a difference in degree and not in kind 
with respect to the sensible causes that we find in the body machines 
of other animals.22 In other words, wonder is always interlaced with the 
ebbs and flows of our bodily landscape, although it is also the origin of 
intellectual activity. In stark opposition to the revival of stoicism in the 
seventeenth century, with its explicit aim of eliminating the passions and 
its ideal of the insensible sage, Descartes holds that a conception of a 
passionless human life is both nonsensical and damaging.23 The com-
mon conception of the Cartesian cogito as a disembodied and glittering 
exercise of cold rationality may reflect a plausible, perhaps even obvious, 
reading of Descartes’s famous metaphysical works such as Meditations and 
The Principles of Philosophy, but it becomes untenable in the light of his 
correspondence with Elisabeth and his last major work on the passions. 
Feelings motivate, orient, and sustain our rational thinking about the 
world, other people, and ourselves, and it is not possible to separate 
thinking and feeling in an actual human life. 
Wonder is the origin of philosophical and scientific knowledge. 
Without the initial physical commotion of the subtle mechanisms of the 
brain caused by perceptions of the world around us, the grosser animal 
spirits of our body would not allow us to concern ourselves with matters 
other than the immediate satisfaction of our bodily needs. The habits of 
the body are strong and continuously fuelled by the mechanical inertia 
which characterizes the physical world. Our capacity for wonder makes 
us sensitive to that which is “new, or very different from what we knew 
in the past or what we supposed it was going to be” (PS art. 753:52), and 
as such it is able to excite a mind numbed by the humdrum of everyday 
life. Wonder thus has the capacity to keep our thoughts from running 
tired in the dull, one could say mechanical, working of human life, 
and in this way it can help us maintain the acuteness of our intellectual 
engagement. To retain the passion of wonder through the burden of 
everyday obligations and mindless habits is not easy, although Descartes 
rather briskly asserts that “it is only the dull and stupid people who do 
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not have any constitutional inclination toward Wonder” (PS art. 77:61). 
So wonder is the presupposition for acquiring knowledge in the first 
place. We have seen, however, that wonder is ambivalent, since it must be 
developed with the aim of cultivating inner excitations of the soul such 
as intellectual joy, love, and generosity. If wonder remains a superficial 
fascination with new objects or, say, strangely formed people, it can very 
easily degenerate into stultified curiosity. Healthy wonder whets our 
intellectual appetite for acquiring firm scientific knowledge about the 
causal underpinnings of what we experience, whereas pleasure derived 
from asinine curiosity is a mere expression of, literally, a superficial 
stimulation of our mindless bodily spirits. 
Descartes’s treatment of the passions therefore supports Dixon’s argu-
ment about our contemporary impoverished emotional vocabulary, and 
makes us aware of the complex affective aspect of intellectual activity—an 
issue that is often overlooked in philosophical discussions of emotions 
today. It is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between bodily feel-
ings and cognitive emotions. Our rationality is as affective as our more 
explicitly bodily feelings, and the body always plays a significant role in 
our exercise of our rational capacity. The bodily mechanisms involved 
in wonder help direct and maintain our attention to an object, just 
as intellectual joy causes a physiological agitation in the brain that is 
needed to secure our inquisitive concentration amidst the perceptible 
confusion of our embodied nature (PS art. 70:56–57; art. 120:82). The 
general picture of affectivity depicted by Descartes is characterized by 
an ambivalence most evident in the two aspects of wonder. Contrary 
to the passive pleasure entailed by the unruly passions of curiosity and 
stupor, the intellectual emotions, such as joy, generosity, and love, involve 
an excitation of the will that allows us to find intellectual pleasure and 
even joy in pursuing a better understanding of that which may at first 
produce pain, surprise, boredom, sadness, or sorrow. 
The Mood of Feelings and Emotions
By reaching back to Descartes’s conception of affectivity, we get a less 
fractured, albeit more puzzling, picture of emotional life. But what kind 
of emotion is Descartes’s wonder if we approach it from the perspec-
tive of either feeling theory or cognitive theory? It is not a mere bodily 
feeling, nor can it be adequately explained by means of intentional or 
rational structures. Rather, it seems to be an ambivalent blend of both. 
Wonder can, and surely often does, have an object. I normally wonder 
about something specific. And yet, Descartes argues, what is crucial to 
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wonder is not so much the object of our wonder, but how we wonder. 
Moreover, bodily feelings are central to Descartes’s understanding. They 
are not merely ornaments of the emotion, as Solomon characterized 
feelings, but an essential part of the experience of wonder (that is, our 
bodily agitation enables our perceptual focus and secures our mental 
concentration). Finally, wonder is the affective presupposition for our 
other emotions, because it qualifies our general attitude to what is go-
ing on around us (thus, wonder may lead to both asinine curiosity and 
scientific discovery). Or as Luce Irigaray puts in her short, but brilliant 
analysis: “Wonder [L’admiration] is the motivating force behind mobil-
ity in all its dimensions. From its most vegetative to its most sublime 
functions, the living being has need of wonder to move.”24 It should be 
clear, then, that the significance which Descartes ascribes to feelings of 
wonder cannot be probed by either the category of feeling or that of 
emotion. The reason for this, we believe, is that wonder is more akin 
to what is normally characterized as a mood. 
Contrary to feelings and emotions, moods do not carry with them 
explicitly causal and cognitive connotations. Rather, they seem to imply 
both, in that they are both highly sensitive to the ebbs and flows of our 
bodily landscape and yet also intensely personal. This ambivalence se-
verely complicates our attempts to find either a physiological or an inten-
tional correlate to the experience of mood. It is, perhaps, because of this 
ambivalence that—with a few recent exceptions—systematic treatments 
of moods have figured only rarely in Anglophone philosophy of emotion 
where, as we noticed above, the emphasis in the twentieth century has 
primarily been on conceptual analysis and language. Nevertheless, the 
brief explanation of mood that we present in this section draws upon 
recent important work in that tradition by philosophers such as Richard 
Wollheim, Quentin Smith, Peter Goldie, and Matthew Ratcliffe.25 Our 
main source of inspiration, though, comes from continental philosophy, 
especially the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition, where 
analyses of moods have figured more regularly, if not prominently. From 
within this tradition, we draw principally on Kierkegaard, Scheler, Hei-
degger, Otto Bollnow, Ricoeur, Stephan Strasser, Hubertus Tellenbach, 
and Thomas Fuchs.26 
Despite the general absence of systematic treatments of mood in An-
glophone philosophy, one of the most poignant and vivid descriptions 
of the experiential and behavioral character of mood can be found in a 
twentieth-century classic from that tradition, namely, Gilbert Ryle’s The 
Concept of Mind from 1949: 
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[S]omewhat as this morning’s weather in a given locality made the same sort of 
difference to every section of that neighbourhood, so a person’s mood during a 
given period colours all or most of his actions and reactions during that period. 
His work and his play, his talk and his grimaces, his appetite and his daydreams, 
all reflect his touchiness, his joviality or his depression. Any one of them may 
serve as a barometer for all the others . . . Somewhat as the entire ship is cruis-
ing south-east, rolling, or vibrating, so the entire person is nervous, serene or 
gloomy. His own corresponding inclination will be to describe the whole world 
as menacing, congenial, or grey.27
This description of mood clearly brings out its global and diffuse char-
acter. Moods, as Ryle observes, somehow involve the whole person, are 
unfocused, unmotivated, and tend to last longer than other kinds of 
emotional experience. In this sense, moods bring out features of emo-
tional experience that are markedly different from those examined by 
cognitive and feeling theories. 
When I feel anger, love, or jealousy, the myriad feelings involved in 
these emotional experiences are characterized by intense bodily reactions 
and normally have a more or less circumscribed object. For instance, 
the bout of anger I feel when a person cuts in front of me in the su-
permarket queue leaves no doubt either about the object of my anger 
(the rude intruder) or the clearly involuntary physical expression of my 
bruised feelings (quickened heartbeat, muscles and sinews quivering 
with tension). The intentional and physical features of my anger readily 
admit of both a rational explanation (my feeling of anger is embedded 
in an intentionally structured emotion triggered because of the insulting 
gesture) and a physiological explanation (my angry feelings are the work 
of prereflective, subpersonal physiological reactions). The circumscribed 
character and relatively brief endurance of such object-directed emotions 
allow us to single out features, be they (neuro)physical or intentional, 
which enable more or less convincing explanations of what we are feel-
ing or why we are feeling what we feel. 
The experience of moods seems to elude such explanatory endeavors. 
Moods are hazy, impalpable, and often ineffable phenomena with no 
apparent intentional object or clear experiential structure. As a result, 
they seem less amenable to analysis or rational explanation. Where most 
emotions and feelings tend to focus our attention on what is going on 
around us, moods are more like a background atmosphere. A mood 
normally does not single out any specific feature of our experience; 
rather, it seems to suffuse our experience as a whole with a certain affec-
tive hue or tinge, and thus to qualify the way we experience the world, 
other people, and ourselves. Moods are feelings in the most sensuous 
meaning of the word. They are more like a tonality, a coloring, a flavor, 
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a weight, a taste, an emptiness, an I-know-not-what, a simmering bodily 
sensation, a certain air, a disposition, a way of being in the world. In 
short, a mood is what makes a thought sad or happy. It is what makes the 
phrase “I love you” either heartfelt or shallow. Moods can be personal 
as well as interpersonal. A good mood is contagious, as well as a tense 
mood. Unlike most of our emotions, moods normally do not direct a 
person towards anything in particular, but that does not mean that they 
do not carry informative value. On the contrary, they are perhaps the 
most densely informative phenomena of our emotional life. Moods do 
not inform us about the “what” of our feelings or the “why” of our emo-
tions, but they disclose “how” something is felt, which, in turn, tends to 
problematize and transform into open questions the “what” and “why” 
of our other feelings and emotions. 
In other words, moods are deeply ambivalent phenomena. We think 
that this informative overload disclosed by moods is one of the reasons 
why philosophy of emotion tends to refrain from questions about mood 
and moody questions. Literature, poetry, and not least psychopathology, 
on the other hand, are all concerned with deciphering the overload 
of information disclosed by the ambivalence of our moods. A good 
novel or a good piece of poetry can be about almost nothing, and yet 
make us understand what seems to be everything. Similarly, descriptive 
psychopathology knows that our attempts at understanding the “what” 
and “why” of mood disorders lies in the accuracy of our description of 
the “how.” In this sense, mood is suitable for bringing out an aspect of 
our emotional life that is neglected by feeling and cognitive theories, 
namely, the subjectivity of our emotions; how we feel about what we 
feel and how our emotions affect our thinking about what we feel. Our 
feelings about feeling and thinking inform us, as Ricoeur argues, that 
“affectivity is the non-transparent aspect of the Cogito. We are right in 
saying ‘of the Cogito.’ Affectivity is still a mode of thought in its wid-
est sense. To feel is still to think [sentir est encore penser], though feeling 
no longer represents objectivity, but rather reveals existence [révélateur 
d’existence]. Affectivity uncovers my bodily existence as the other pole of 
all the dense and heavy existence of the world. We can express it oth-
erwise by saying that through feeling the personal body [le corps propre] 
belongs to the subjectivity of the Cogito.”28 Mind and body are inescap-
ably linked in our mood. Through the atmospheric character of moods, 
body is disclosed as thinking body and thinking as bodily thinking. Not 
an either-or, but a both-and. 
We argued earlier that the bifurcation of feeling theories and cognitive 
theories can be understood within the larger context of two different 
conceptions of human nature that view either biology or rationality as 
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the key to explaining how humans think, feel, and behave. They are, 
in other words, theories which explain emotions from the perspective 
of certain ontological conceptions of human nature. Emotional experi-
ence is used as an integral part of an answer to the question of what it 
is to be human, and not as something that problematizes our attempts 
to answer such a fundamental question. But that is exactly what moods 
(as well as sensations, affections, affects, passions, and other more hazy 
emotional phenomena) do. “Mood [Stemning],” Kierkegaard writes, “is 
like the Niger River in Africa; no one knows its source, no one knows 
its outlet—only its reach is known.”29 Rather than providing answers, 
they complicate them by introducing ambivalence, hesitation, and 
atmospheric uncertainty into our inquiry. Once again, Irigaray brings 
out this atmospheric aspect of Cartesian wonder with exemplary clarity. 
Wonder, she writes, is:  
A birth into transcendence, that of the other, still sensible [sensible], still physical 
and carnal, and already spiritual. Is it the place of incidence and junction of 
body and spirit, which has been covered over again and again, hardened through 
repetitions that hamper growth and flourishing? This would be possible only 
when we are faithful to the perpetual newness of the self, the other, the world. 
Faithful to becoming, to its virginity, its power of impulsion, without letting go 
the support of bodily inscription. Wonder would be the passion of the encounter 
between the most material and the most metaphysical, of their possible concep-
tion and fecundation one by the other. A third dimension. An intermediary.30 
The affective resonance of our moods influences the way we experi-
ence the world by molding our attitude to what we experience. It is the 
affective texture through which we receive the world and the affective 
medium by means of which we engage with the world. In other words, 
our mood has a fundamental bearing on how we perceive, think, feel, and 
act. This is what Irigaray wants to make us notice in Cartesian wonder, 
namely, that how we wonder affects the way we understand and engage 
with the world, other people, and ourselves.
Moody Philosophy and the Loss of Ambivalence
To explore the mood ingrained in philosophical writing is a daunting 
enterprise. If we are right that moods express the attitude underlying a 
person’s experience of and engagement with the world, other people, 
and herself, then an appreciation of the mood of a philosophical text 
will tell us something of the inquiring attitude or exploratory character 
of that text. What we say on these concluding pages should be consid-
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ered merely as a suggestion to think more seriously about the mood of 
philosophical works, and not as an attempt at an exhaustive treatment. 
At the center of Raphael’s famous fresco of the School of Athens 
(1510–11), we find depicted the two greatest philosophers of antiq-
uity. The aging Plato, holding vertically in his left hand his vertiginous 
philosophical cosmology, the Timaeus, points with his right index finger 
towards the sky, while the mature Aristotle, holding his ethical mas-
terpiece, the Nicomachean Ethics, horizontally in his left hand, calmly 
extends the palm of his right hand over the earth. Raphael here clearly 
tries to capture figuratively the atmosphere or mood at work in the two 
philosophies. While the later Plato revelled in unequivocal dualisms 
between the sensible and insensible and in a Pythagorean mysticism, 
Aristotle, even in his most daunting metaphysical speculations, kept in 
touch with the perceptible world of tragedy, common sense ethics, and 
reasonable politics. When reading the later dialogues of Plato alongside 
the works of Aristotle, one finds that Raphael has, in fact, succeeded 
quite well in capturing the moods of the two thinkers. Similarly, if one 
reads Spinoza’s geometrically and stringently structured Ethics (1677) 
together with Hume’s eloquent Treatise (1739–40), one cannot but notice 
the pronounced difference in atmosphere. Spinoza’s radical rationalism, 
with its logical denunciations of the passions, saturates the structure 
and expression of almost every sentence, and Hume’s no less radical 
empiricist skepticism towards our rational capacities allows his passions, 
sentiments, and taste to animate the text. It is, however, the mood of 
another great philosopher that is of interest to us here. While Spinoza’s 
rationalism and Hume’s empiricism convey a dominant atmosphere of, 
in the first case, sober metaphysical gravity and, in the second, a more 
cheerfully embodied elegance, the atmosphere that characterizes the 
philosophy of Kant is more ambivalent.     
Kant is without doubt one of the most influential philosophers in the 
Western tradition. His influence, though, is not limited to philosophy. 
Like Descartes before him and Darwin after, Kant marks a watershed in 
how we think about physical nature, human existence, art, ethics, and 
religion. From this perspective, then, his work seems an obvious candi-
date for an examination of the mood of philosophy. In another sense, 
however, he may seem an awkward choice. In contrast to the rich treat-
ment of emotions in the work of philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, Kant’s writings suffer from a 
remarkable absence of any systematic treatment of emotional life, and 
are characterized by an even more suspicious stance towards emotions 
than is normally found among philosophers. Nevertheless, the mood 
of Kant’s philosophy is particularly interesting, since his work combines 
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the confidence and stringency of the dawning scientific attitude of his 
time with a philosophical humility and a deep-rooted sense of wonder. 
Like his favorite thinker, Rousseau, he considers the rational enterprise 
of philosophy with an entrenched yet ambivalent blend of enlighten-
ment, enthusiasm, and Romantic skepticism. In fact, his equivocal, 
almost paradoxical, insistence on both empiricism and idealism makes 
his philosophy an expression of the complex philosophical mood of a 
time characterized by an unresolved tension of scientific and religious 
attitudes. 
Towards the end of the terse analytical part of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son (first edition 1781; second edition 1787), after having meticulously 
traced the scope and limits of the possibility of objectively warranted 
experience, Kant eloquently describes the reflective passage from objec-
tive solidity to the obscure terrain of unrestrained thinking: 
We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding [das 
Land des reinen Verstandes], and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have 
also surveyed it, and determined the place for each thing in it. This land, 
however, is an island, and enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself. 
It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy 
ocean, the true seat of illusion [Sitze des Scheins], where many a fog bank and 
rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with 
empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, entwine him in 
adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never bring to an end.31
What is of interest here is the complexity of Kant’s vivid picture of the 
mind. On the one hand, we have the stringent philosopher of objectively 
warranted experience. We can—and should—measure, categorize, and 
determine the intrinsic capacities and sensible bounds of reason. Only 
by explicating the scope and limit of the possibility of sensible knowl-
edge can we avoid the foggy illusions of superstition and sentimental 
delusions. On the other hand, though, we are bound to leave the safe 
shores of objective knowledge and set out on the turbulent quest for an 
unwarranted, insensible knowledge. Human reason cannot and will not 
remain enclosed by its own limits. We have an ineradicable inclination 
to go beyond our own reasonable capacities.32 This sensitivity to our hu-
man inclination to go beyond the sensible use of reason is not simply a 
curious but insignificant feature of Kant’s philosophy, but what animates 
the heart of his philosophical attitude. The most famous expression of 
this attitude appears towards the end of his ethical masterpiece, the 
Critique of Practical Reason from 1788: “Two things fill the mind [Gemüth] 
with ever new and increasing admiration [Bewunderung] and reverence 
[Ehrfurcht], the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the 
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starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not need to search 
for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in ob-
scurity or in the transcendent region [im Überschwenglichen] beyond my 
horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the 
consciousness of my existence [dem Bewußtsein meiner Existenz].”33 Kant 
immediately adds that “though admiration and respect can indeed excite 
inquiry, they cannot supply the want of it.”34 Contrary to the full-blooded 
Romantics who were beginning to advance the claim that “Feeling is 
everything/Names are but sound and smoke,”35 Kant retained the need 
for rational arguments and insisted that our feelings (of, for instance, 
wonder, admiration, and reverence) should be allayed with cold drops 
of scientific temperance. As he writes,“There is something splendid 
about innocence [Unschuld]; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that 
it cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced. Because of this, 
even wisdom [Weisheit]—which otherwise consists more in conduct than 
in knowledge—still needs science [Wissenschaft], not in order to learn 
from it but in order to provide access and durability for its precepts.”36
This blend of untainted wonder and scientific rigor, of reverence and 
skepticism, of feeling and rationality animates the mood of Kant’s work, 
that is, his way of doing philosophy. Although this ambivalent mood is 
articulated with a particular honesty by Kant, we would argue that it is 
also to be found in the texture of most great philosophical texts. We have 
already seen it at work in Descartes’s passion of wonder, and a similar 
analysis of the works of, say, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard would reveal other expressions of the am-
bivalence of rational thinking and bodily feeling. These philosophers 
have worked patiently at making sense of this ambivalence, that is, at 
analyzing, understanding, and explaining the mixture of thinking and 
feeling that characterizes the experience of being human. And yet, this 
mood is only rarely conveyed in philosophical textbooks. When we read 
about the philosophy of, say, Descartes or Kant, we are mostly presented 
with the results of their work, that is, the “what” and the “why” of their 
thinking—sometimes garnished with short quotations from central pas-
sages. The only way to capture the affective nuances that inspire and 
animate a philosopher’s thinking—the mood, the attitude, the “how” of 
his or her way of thinking—remains the patient reading of the work itself.
The ambivalence of mood that we find in the works of the great 
philosophers seems to have been resolved in contemporary academic 
philosophy. Today, one rarely comes across a moody philosophical text. 
This does not necessarily mean that philosophy has become more resolute 
with regard to big questions about the world or human nature, or better 
at producing unequivocal answers to the practical question about how we 
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should live our life. Rather, in the latter decades of the twentieth century 
serious philosophers simply refrained from dealing with such grand ques-
tions, and instead concentrated their work on more technical aspects 
of epistemology, ontology, logic, and ethics. This present condition of 
philosophy is a consequence of the development that we explained in 
the beginning of this essay. While science and religion fought furious 
battle over the nature of world and human beings, academic philosophy 
chose the path of less emotionally charged questions and answers.37 As 
a result of this development, philosophy has becomes less moody, but 
also less exciting for those who are not trained to find pleasure in the 
rational analysis of academic philosophy. 
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